In this judgment, the Chamber analyses an appeal lodged against the judgment that had ordered the appellant to pay civil liability compensation for the damage caused by the commission of a forest fire offence.
The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court has established that compensation and other civil liabilities arising from a final criminal judgment are not subject to a statute of limitations.
‘Once the judgment has been declared final, its enforcement and civil rulings may continue until the creditor has been fully satisfied, in accordance with Article 570 of the Civil Procedure Act, without the statute of limitations or expiry being applicable,’ the court states.
At Belzuz Abogados, S.L.P., as specialists in civil liability insurance, we have analysed the judgment dated 12 May 2001, which became final on 17 September 2001, xxx was convicted as the perpetrator of a forest fire offence and, among other rulings, was ordered to pay the Directorate-General for Emergencies and Civil Security of the Department of the Interior of Catalonia the sum of 22,301,372 pesetas, which has not been paid to date, the convicted person having been required to pay these amounts on 20 November 2001.
After referring the proceedings to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for its opinion on the possible expiry of the civil liabilities imposed in the judgment, the following report was issued on 22 September 2016:
“It opposes the expiry on the grounds that the institution of expiry is inapplicable to the aforementioned financial obligation, based on the following arguments:
The limitation periods for civil actions set out in the Civil Code temporarily limit the right to demand payment of a specific obligation under the terms established in consideration of the nature of the obligation. In this regard, applying this idea to the criminal sphere, the rule set out in the second paragraph of Article 1964 of the Civil Code has been applied in relation to the limitation of civil liability arising from tort.
This rule established a general limitation period of fifteen years, currently five years, to be counted, if we adhere to the rule established in Article 1971 of the Civil Code, from the moment the judgment becomes final.
The Court of First Instance issued the following ruling: ‘To declare the civil liabilities arising from the present case and for which xxxr was convicted to be time-barred.’
Once the order had been notified, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General of the Generalitat de Catalunya lodged appeals before the Civil and Criminal Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, forming Appeal Roll 1/2017. On 19 March 2018, the aforementioned court handed down its ruling, the literal wording of which is as follows:
To uphold the appeals lodged by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General of the Generalitat de Catalunya against the order of 22 November 2016 handed down by the Presiding Judge of the Jury Court of the Provincial Court of Barcelona in Enforcement Order No. 137/2001, arising from Jury Court Proceedings No. 18/2000, which is therefore REVOKED; orders the reinstatement of Enforcement Order No. 137/2001 to the moment prior to the issuance of the revoked decision, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Article 9843 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
In response to this order, the legal representative of xxx announced, in a timely manner, their intention to file an appeal.
The Supreme Court now confirms the thesis that civil liability arising from a criminal conviction is not subject to a statute of limitations.
In its ruling, the Court explains that it had been an undisputed jurisprudential criterion that if an enforcement order was stayed for 15 years, the action to enforce the civil provisions of the judgement would be barred by prescription, pursuant to Articles 1964 and 1971 of the Civil Code, and that the Supreme Court’s own doctrine had so held.
But the novelty of this ruling lies in the court’s emphasis that the legislative framework has changed following two legislative amendments (Law 1/2000 of January 7 on Civil Procedure, which introduced a novel five-year expiration period for enforcement proceedings, and Law 42/2015, which shortened the general limitation period from 15 to five years), requiring a reconsideration of this issue and a review of the doctrine of criminal procedure and the legal interests protected.
The judgement argues that in criminal sentences the protection of the crime victim gives rise to a very particular need for judicial oversight, which explains why the court is vested with the power and initiative to enforce its rulings, even its civil pronouncements.
That need for enhanced judicial protection “justifies interpreting the rules of the enforcement process in the manner most favourable to their full effectiveness.”
The court explains that. “In that regard, it is settled doctrine—the court argues—that both forfeiture and prescription are not grounded in reasons of strict justice, but in criteria of legal certainty anchored in the presumption that a right has been abandoned by its holder, which requires a restrictive interpretation.”
The Court recalls that in criminal proceedings the enforcement of civil judgements is carried out ex officio and not at the request of a party. Therefore, there is no reason to recognise a statute of limitations for the exercise of the enforcement action, because the right declared in the judgement does not require such action. And therefore it is not necessary to file a lawsuit to enforce the judgement.
CONCLUSION
In light of all of the foregoing, the Supreme Court concludes that the enforcement proceedings in the criminal jurisdiction are not subject to the expiration periods set forth in Articles 518 of the Civil Procedure Law (LEC) and 1964 of the Civil Code, and holds that “once the judgement has become final, the enforcement of its civil provisions may continue until the creditor is fully satisfied, as provided in Article 570 of the LEC, without being subject to either prescription or expiration.”
In response to this ruling, a single judge issued a dissenting opinion, indicating his disagreement not with the decision adopted by the majority, but with the argument that the action is imprescriptible, on the grounds that the requirements of legal certainty—which the institution of prescription seeks to protect—“preclude affirming the imprescriptibility of civil liability arising from a criminal conviction.”
At Belzuz Abogados S.L.P., as a firm specialising in Insurance Law and Civil Liability, we are at your disposal to advise you on the impact of this reform, both from the perspective of insurance practice and in defending the interests of victims and policyholders.
José Garzón
Departamento de Seguros
España
BELZUZ ABOGADOS SLP, Insuralex´s Exclusive Member in Spain and Portugal
